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We study an admission control model in revenue management with non-stationary and correlated demands
over a finite discrete time horizon. The arrival probabilities are updated by current available information, i.e.,
past customer arrivals and some other exogenous information. We develop a regret-based framework, which
measures the difference in revenue between a clairvoyant optimal policy that has access to all realizations of
randomness a priori and a given feasible policy which does not have access to this future information. This
regret minimization framework better spells out the trade-offs of each accept/reject decision. We proceed
using the lens of approximation algorithms to devise a conceptually simple regret-parity policy. We show
the proposed policy achieves 2-approximation of the optimal policy in terms of total regret for a two-class
problem, and then extend our results to a multi-class problem with a fairness constraint. Our goal in this
paper is to make progress towards understanding the marriage between stochastic regret minimization and
approximation algorithms in the realm of revenue management and dynamic resource allocation.
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1. Introduction
We propose and analyze a simple admission control policy for a class of revenue management
problems under non-stationary customer arrivals. There is a given positive and non-replenishable
inventory M of some product to be sold to arriving customers of two different classes in a finite
time horizon T . Class-1 customers are willing to pay r1 per unit of product which is more than
what class-2 customers are willing to pay (i.e., r1 ≥ r2 ≥ 0). The demand for each class is modeled
as a non-homogeneous Poisson process whose (instantaneous) arrival rates are time-varying and
correlated and whose distributions can be updated by current available information, i.e., past
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customer arrivals and some other exogenous information. This is the main new feature of this paper,
which captures realistic phenomena such as demand seasonality and forecast updating mechanisms.
Unsatisfied demand units are lost with no penalty cost. The firm can decide whether to accept or
reject an arriving customer, so as to maximize the expected revenue over the planning horizon.
The model is motivated by a wide range of applications, such as vacation timeshare management,
online retailing, and workforce management. For example, Hilton Grand Vacations Club offers
timeshares at different prices and levels of membership. A platinum customer will have a higher
priority than a non-platinum (or regular) customer when it comes to selecting a particular home
resort (e.g., reserving a room in Elara on the Las Vegas strip). The arrival process of customers
clearly depends on the tourism seasons (e.g., more platinum customers will select Elara Las Vegas
during the Christmas season) as well as the total number of members of Hilton Grand Vacations
Club. Another example is in online retailing. Anthropologie clothing online offers discount coupons
to customers. The regular customers (without coupons), who are willing to pay the tagged prices,
are always accepted. On the other hand, the discounted customers (with coupons) could be rejected
since these coupon code offers are subject to discretion and availability. The demand process is
also non-stationary and evolving, according to the season and the product’s popularity.
It is worthwhile noting that our model encompasses many important non-stationary demand
processes studied in the literature, including Markov modulated demand processes (described in §6),
time series models [43], the martingale model of forecast evolution [23, 28] and models with advance
demand information [18]. However, finding the optimal admission control policies using brute-force
dynamic programming is computationally intractable, since the state space of the corresponding
dynamic programs is usually large (which is extensively discussed in §2.1). Hence, our main focus of
this paper is to prescribe an effective and provably-good heuristic policy for this class of problems.
1.1. Main Results and Contributions
The main results and contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
First, we study the aforementioned class of admission control based revenue management prob-
lems using a regret minimization framework. The regret of a feasible policy is defined as the
difference in revenue between a clairvoyant optimal policy (that has access to all realizations of
randomness a priori at the beginning of the time horizon) and the feasible policy (which does
not have access to this future information). We propose a conceptually simple admission control
policy, called the regret-parity policy π̃, that perfectly balances the regret of an acceptance decision
against that of a rejection decision. We show that the regret ratio of π̃ (defined as the ratio of
the regret of π̃ to the regret of an optimal policy) is always bounded above by 2 in a two-class
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setting (Theorem 1). We then extend our model and results to a multi-class setting under a fairness
constraint (Theorem 2).
This regret-based performance measure is different from the conventional revenue-based perfor-
mance measure (defined as the ratio of the revenue of a feasible policy to that of an optimal policy).
In many applications such as online retailing with low price discrimination (e.g., Anthropologie
clothing online), the after-tax profit margin is very thin (around 5%) and even a small improve-
ment is significant. In such cases, the revenue difference between two feasible policies would be
small, and the regret ratio could arguably better gauge the effectiveness of a given feasible policy
by quantifying its operational mistakes, thereby improving the firm’s overall decision making and
profitability. We discuss their connections between these two performance measures in §3.3.
Second, our numerical results demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed regret-parity policy π̃
under a large set of demand and parameter instances. The empirical performance of π̃ is usually
much better than 2. More specifically, Tables 1–3 show that π̃ performs consistently well in term of
expected revenue and regret, compared to an optimal policy. Compared to the robust benchmark
algorithms proposed in Ball and Queyranne [1], we gain around 16% more expected revenue, which
is quite significant. It is worth noting that the proposed policy can be efficiently implemented in an
online manner, i.e., the decision at any time is computed based only on the current observed state
of the system and does not depend on future decisions. This is in contrast to solving an optimal
policy exactly using a brute-force dynamic programming approach, which suffers from the curse of
dimensionality.
Finally, we note that the regret-parity policy belongs to the family of cost-balancing policies
that are predominantly used in stochastic inventory control problems (cf. Levi et al. [37, 39, 36]).
The main idea underlying this approach is to isolate and quantify the marginal impact of each
operational decision (from the moment it is made until the end of the planning horizon). When
we consider the problem of interest from the view of revenue maximization, it is straightforward
to count the immediate revenue resulted from each acceptance/rejection decision, but it is difficult
(or perhaps impossible) to measure how each acceptance/rejection decision impacts the overall
(future) revenue. As a result, the conventional methods developed in their papers cannot be directly
applied in the revenue management setting. In contrast, under the regret minimization framework,
we are able to readily quantify the marginal impact of each acceptance/rejection decision in terms
of regret (relative to a full-information benchmark). This enables us to design an efficient and
effective cost-balancing algorithm, and compare the costs of two different policies. Our worst-case
analysis involves dealing with this regret-based (mistake-based) objective as well as a randomized
decision rule, which advances the current methodology in cost-balancing algorithms.
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We believe that the ideas and techniques developed in this paper could be applied to other classes
of revenue management or resource allocation problems. The notion of approximation ratios (or
worst-case performance guarantees) has also been gaining acceptance in the revenue management
literature (see, e.g., Chen and Farias [10], Dragos and Farias [15], Chan and Farias [8]). For instance,
Chen and Farias [10] gives a class of re-optimized fixed price (RFP) policies that yields at least
0.342 of the optimal policy for a classical single-product dynamic pricing problem but allowing the
scale of demand intensity to be modulated by an exogenous market size stochastic process.
1.2. Relevant Literature
Our work is closely related to the following streams of literature.
Revenue management. Most revenue management models assume that the demand process
is a time-homogeneous, mainly for its mathematical tractability (see, e.g., [19, 27, 6, 54, 14, 5, 51]).
Revenue management models with non-stationary demand environments are much less common in
the literature. Gallego and van Ryzin [20] studied dynamic pricing problems in a changing demand
environment where the temporal evolution of the demand model is known. They established asymp-
totic optimality for their policies by solving a deterministic counterpart problem. Netessine [44]
analyzed the pricing problem with a limited number of price changes in a dynamic environment
in which demand depends on the current price and time. Zhao and Zheng [57] considered a con-
tinuous time dynamic pricing problem with non-homogeneous Poisson processes, and showed that
the optimal price decreases with inventory. They also identified a sufficient condition under which
the optimal price decreases over time for a given inventory level. Cao et al. [7] considered a similar
problem with non-homogeneous Poisson customer arrival processes, and obtained the structural
properties of optimal policies by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation.
It shall be noted that our worst-case regret ratio has a similar philosophical underpinning to the
rapidly growing area of robust optimization. Since the future demand information is often uncertain
and evolving, the firm only has limited (present) information to make good decisions. Robust opti-
mization has been widely adopted under limited and sparse information to protect the firm from
the worst-case scenarios (see, e.g., Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [2] and Bertsimas and Sim [3]). In the
revenue management literature, Perakis and Roels [46] developed robust formulations for capacity
allocation in network revenue management. Birbil et al. [4] devised an efficient algorithm based
on robust optimization to compute the maximum booking limits in a single-leg airline revenue
management problem. Lan et al. [35] focused on the relative regret in overbooking and fare-class
allocation for a multi-fare, single-resource problem in revenue management. Rusmevichientong and
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Topaloglu [49] studied robust formulations of assortment optimization problems under the multi-
nomial logit choice model. Geng et al. [21] studied a two-customer sequential resource allocation
problem with a max-min fill-rate objective, and characterized the structure of optimal solutions
with a bounded discrete distribution. Closer to our work, Ball and Queyranne [1] carried out a
thorough competitive analysis of nested booking limits in an online adversarial setting. The main
point of departure from their work is that we consider a regret-based (mistake-based) objective,
and therefore the main results obtained are incomparable.
Stochastic knapsack and dynamic resource allocation. Another relevant line of research
to this work is the class of dynamic and stochastic knapsack problems. Papastavrou et al. [45]
and Kleywegt and Papastavrou [32, 33] considered variants of dynamic and stochastic knapsack
problems where items (with random size and rewards) arrive according to a time-homogeneous
Poisson process, and an accept/reject decision needs to be made upon each item’s arrival so as to
maximize the expected profit (rewards minus costs) accumulated. They showed that a threshold-
type policy is optimal and also derived a number of monotonicity and convexity properties. Lueker
[41] gave an O(logn)-competitive algorithm for the 0/1 online knapsack problem, where n is the
number of arriving items. Dean et al. [13] also considered a stochastic 0/1 knapsack problem with
deterministic arrivals and item values but random item sizes. They bounded its adaptivity gap
by developing a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a non-adaptive policy whose expected
value approximates that of an optimal adaptive policy within a factor of 4. These models are very
similar to ours; however, our work considers a non-stationary, correlated and evolving demand
process, which requires new analytical methods to be analyzed.
Our work is related to the domain of online reservation or selection problems. Elmachtoub and
Levi [17, 16] considered online versions of supply chain management and logistics models where
customers arrive sequentially, and one has to decide whether to accept or reject the customer upon
her arrival. They developed several algorithms with small constant competitive ratios, i.e., for any
sequence of arriving customers, the cost incurred by the online algorithm is within a fixed constant
factor of the cost incurred by the respective optimal solution that has full knowledge upfront on
the sequence of arriving customers. Van Hentenryck et al. [53] proposed constant approximation
algorithms for online reservation or online multi-knapsack problems with or without overbooking.
We also refer interested readers to Coffman Jr. et al. [12] for an excellent survey on online bin
packing problems. Our regret-parity framework shares some similarities with the competitive per-
formance measures used there, in that the common benchmark involves the full-information (or
offline) solution.
Page 5 of 30
John Wiley & Sons
Naval Research Logistics











Another relevant domain is dynamic resource allocation in controlled queueing and commu-
nication networks (see Kelly [30] for an overview). Most papers on dynamic resource allocation
problems also assume time-homogeneous Poisson arrival processes (see, e.g., [31], [22], [29]). Closer
to our work, Levi and Radovanović [38] used a simple knapsack-type linear program (LP) to decide
whether to accept or reject incoming customer requests. They showed that their proposed policy
is guaranteed to achieve at least half of the optimal long-run revenue. However, the counterpart
models with non-stationary arrivals are invariably much harder to study (e.g., [48] and [26]). Yoon
and Lewis [55] proposed a pointwise stationary approximation (PSA) to approximate the opti-
mal policies in a multi-class queueing system with non-homogeneous Poisson arrival processes and
periodically varying parameters. Green and Kolesar [24] and Massey and Whitt [42] considered
peak hour congestion in a multi-server queuing system under non-homogeneous Poisson arrival
processes. Kumar et al. [34] devised dynamic control policies for a single-server queue with Markov
modulated arrivals. A key difference between this line of research and our work is that the resource
units in our model are non-reusable, i.e., once sold, they cannot be used to satisfy other customers.
Other related work. Our work is also closely related to the development of approximation
algorithms that admit constant worst-case performance guarantees (see, e.g., Levi et al. [37, 39,
36], Levi and Shi [40], Shi et al. [50], Chao et al. [9]) predominantly in various stochastic inventory
control settings). As mentioned earlier, the conventional techniques and methods developed in
their papers cannot be directly applied to the revenue management setting; in order to establish a
worst-case performance guarantee of 2, one needs to combine them with the regret minimization
framework.
1.3. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we first describe the discrete time model
formulation for a two-class revenue management problem under non-stationary customer demands.
We then present a dynamic programming formulation in §2.1 and a stochastic regret minimization
formulation in §2.2. In §3, we propose a different regret accounting scheme based on decisions.
Then we devise and analyze the regret-parity policy in §4. We extend our model and results to
the multi-class setting under a fairness constraint in §5, and conduct numerical experiments of our
proposed policy in §6. We then point out some plausible future research avenues in §7.
2. Two-Class Problem Formulation
We present the mathematical model for a two-class problem under non-stationary and correlated
customer demands. As a general convention, we often distinguish between a random variable and
its realization using capital letters and lower case letters, respectively.
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Consider a firm selling a fixed number of M perishable homogeneous items to two classes of
customers, indexed by i = 1,2, over a finite planning horizon T periods numbered t = 1, . . . , T .
Inventory is not replenishable. Unsatisfied demand is lost with no penalty cost, and any unsold
items at the end of period T have no residual value or disposal penalty. Each class-i customer pays
ri dollars (r1 ≥ r2 ≥ 0) for a single item. Class-1 customers are always served whenever inventory
units are available; however, the firm needs to decide whether to accept or reject an arriving
class-2 customer, depending on information available, such as current inventory level, the number
of periods remaining, and conditional future demand distributions. The objective is to develop
a provably-good admission control policy (for accepting class-2 customers) that maximizes the
expected total revenue over the planning horizon.
We describe the demand process of our model. In each time period t = 1, . . . , T , there is at
most one arriving customer who wishes to request a single item. The probabilities of having no
customer request, a class-1 customer request, and a class-2 customer request are denoted by p0t ,
p1t , and p
2
t = 1− p0t − p1t , respectively. As part of the model, we assume that at the beginning of
each period t= 1, . . . , T , the firm is endowed with an observed information set ft, which contains
all the realized demand information that is available at the beginning of time period t. More
specifically, the information set ft consists of the realized customer requests over the set of periods
[1, t], and possibly some external information such as the state of the economy and the weather.
The information set ft is a specific realization from the set of all possible realizations, denoted by
Ft. The future arrival probabilities over the set of periods (t, T ] are updated by the information












s(ft) for all s ∈ (t, T ]. With these updated arrival
probabilities, the firm knows the conditional joint distribution of future customer requests, denoted
by It = It(ft). Our model allows for non-stationarity and correlation among the demands in different
periods. We note again that by allowing for correlation we let It be dependent on the realization of
the customer requests over the set of periods [1, t] and possibly on some external information, i.e.,
It is a function of ft. However, the information set ft as well as the conditional joint distribution
It are assumed to be independent of the specific admission control policy being considered. In
other words, the admission control policy does not have any effect on the evolution of the future
demands.
Next, we describe the system dynamics. At the beginning of each period t= 1, . . . , T , the firm
observes the customer request (if any) and its class, and then makes a decision whether to accept
or reject the incoming customer request. We let αt ∈ {0,1} be a binary decision variable, where 0
denotes a rejection and 1 denotes an acceptance. We always accept class-1 customers (i.e., αt = 1)
as long as the inventory is non-empty, since r1 ≥ r2 ≥ 0. The firm needs to decide αt whenever a
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class-2 customer arrives in period t. Let Xt and Yt be the inventory levels in period t before and
after a decision in period t is made, respectively. We have that the initial inventory X1 =M , and
Xt+1 = Yt =Xt−αt for all t= 1, . . . , T . We only restrict our attentions to state-dependent policies
which are non-anticipatory, i.e., in each period t, the information that a feasible admission control
policy π can use consists of the information set ft, and past decisions and inventory levels up to
period t.
2.1. Dynamic Programming Formulation
Our two-class model can be formulated using dynamic programming below. We denote Vt(xt, ft)
as the optimal expected revenue over the set of periods [t, T ], with the starting inventory level xt
and the information set ft. Since optimal policies will always accept class-1 customers as long as
there is positive inventory, the Bellman’s equation is given by
Vt(xt, ft) = E
[(
p0t ·Vt+1(xt,Ft+1) + p1t · (r1 +Vt+1(xt− 1,Ft+1)) (1)
+p2t ·max{r2 +Vt+1(xt− 1,Ft+1), Vt+1(xt,Ft+1)}
) ∣∣∣ ft],
with boundary conditions VT+1(·) = 0 and Vt(0, ft) = 0, t= 1, . . . , T . It can be seen that the state
space grows exponentially fast when the arrival rates are correlated over time. As a result, com-
puting exact optimal policies using dynamic programming is intractable, due to the well-known
curse of dimensionality [47]. This motivates us to devise a conceptually simple and provably-good
approximation algorithm to solve this class of problems.
2.2. Sample Path Regret and its Explicit Expression
We define the random variable W (π;ft) as the total revenue of any feasible policy π given infor-
mation set ft. Then the full-information revenue W (π;fT ) represents the total revenue of π given
a fully realized sample path fT , which is a deterministic value. To properly define our regret, we
carefully distinguish between two different notions of optimality.
(a) Let the clairvoyant optimal policy along a given sample path fT be
π∗ = π∗(fT ) = arg max
π
W (π;fT ).
Note that π∗ knows the full-information fT a priori at the beginning of period 1. Given a
specific realization fT , one can write down π
∗ instantly without any optimization procedures.
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(b) Let the optimal policy for our original stochastic control problem be
πo = arg max
π
E [W (π;f1)] ,
where the expectation is taken over all possible realizations fT . Note that π
o only knows ft at
the beginning of period t= 1, . . . , T , respectively, and πo is in fact the optimal control of the
dynamic programming (1) that attains an expected optimal revenue V1(x1, f1).
With the above notion, the sample path regret of a given feasible policy π is defined as
R (π;fT ),W (π∗;fT )−W (π;fT ) , (2)
which is the difference in revenue between the clairvoyant optimal policy π∗ (which has access to
the entire realization fT a priori at the beginning of period 1) and the feasible policy π (which
only knows f1 at the beginning of period 1). The expected regret via (2) is defined as
E [R(π)] =E [R (π;FT )] , (3)
where the expectation is taken over all possible realizations fT ∈ FT .
Now we find a more explicit expression of the sample path regret defined in (2). Given any








π (fT ) be the numbers
of class-1 and class-2 customers accepted by π, respectively.
Proposition 1. The sample path regret R (π;fT ) defined in (2) can be re-written as
R (π;fT ) = (r1− r2)(C2π −C2π∗)+ + r2(C2π∗ −C2π)+. (4)
We relegate the detailed proof of Proposition 1 to the Appendix. There is an intuitive explanation
of (4). If the number of class-2 customers accepted by π is greater than that accepted by π∗ (i.e.,
C2π ≥ C2π∗), then π “wrongly” accepts C2π −C2π∗ class-2 customers rather than class-1 customers,
and the regret is the cost difference r1− r2 for each such wrong admission. On the other hand, if
the number of class-2 customers accepted by π is less than that accepted by π∗ (i.e., C2π∗ ≥ C2π),
then π loses sales of C2π∗ −C2π class-2 customers and the regret is r2 for each such lost-sale.
3. Regret-Based Reformulation
There is a clear trade-off between accepting and rejecting an arriving class-2 customer. That is, if
we accept the class-2 customer, we gain a revenue rate of r2; however, we may potentially lose a
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sale of a class-1 customer when the inventory is used up. On the other hand, if we reject the class-2
customer, we may eventually lose a sale of r2 if the inventory remains positive at the end of the
planning horizon. Each acceptance or rejection comes with a regret (loss). Our approach attempts
to exploit the trade-off of each decision. We introduce additional notation. Let the random variable
Ai(t,T ] (i= 1,2) denote the number of class-i customers that will arrive over the set of periods (t, T ].
Similarly, let A1,2(t,T ] denote the total number of customers that will arrive over the set of periods
(t, T ].
3.1. Regret of Acceptance
Given any feasible policy π, let RAπt (α
π
t ) be the regret of acceptance decision α
π
t made in period t







t ) = (r1− r2) ·1
(









)+− (A1[t,T ]−Xπt )+] . (5)
This is because that if a class-2 customer arrives in period t, by accepting her, the firm incurs a
regret of r1− r2 only when the event
{
A1(t,T ] ≥Xπt > 0
}
occurs, since the firm could have sold this
item to a class-1 customer. Note that the last equality of (5) also remains valid for the other two
cases. If no customer arrives in period t, we incur zero regret. If a class-1 customer arrives in period
t, by accepting her as long as the inventory is positive, the firm incurs zero regret, i.e., RAπt (1) = 0
since A1(t,T ] + 1 =A
1
[t,T ] and Y
π
t + 1 =X
π
t .
3.2. Regret of Rejection
Given any feasible policy π, let RRπt (α
π
t ) be the regret of rejection decision α
π
t made in period t













































This is because that if a class-2 customer arrives in period t, by rejecting her, the firm incurs








occurs, since the firm has positive
inventory at the end of period T and could have gained r2 from this class-2 customer. Note that
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the last equality of (6) also remains valid for the other two cases. If no customer arrives in period
t, we incur zero regret. If a class-1 customer arrives in period t, by rejecting her only when the





3.3. Regret-Based Performance Measure
The next result asserts that the regrets (associated with each individual decision) defined in §3.1–
3.2 add up to the total regret defined in §2.2. We delegate its proof to the Appendix.












Proposition 2 allows us to reformulate the dynamic programming (1) from a viewpoint of regret
minimization. The original dynamic programming (1) views this revenue management problem as
gradually gaining revenue from zero to the final total revenue as time progresses. The regret mini-
mization problem takes a dual view of the original revenue maximization problem. More specifically,
we start with the clairvoyant optimal revenue W (π∗;fT ) at the beginning, and in each period we
make an admission decision, incurring either the regret of acceptance or the regret of rejection.
After each decision is made, the revenue is penalized by the computed regret. From this dual view,
we start with the highest possible revenue and gradually decrease it as time progresses.
This regret minimization reformulation can also be cast as a dynamic program. Denote Gt(xt, ft)
as the minimum expected regret over the periods [t, T ], with the starting inventory xt and the
information set ft. To minimize the regret, the Bellman’s equation is given by
Gt(xt, ft) = E
[







∣∣∣ ft] ,E[RRt(0;xt) +Gt+1(xt,Ft+1) ∣∣∣ ft]} ,
with boundary conditions GT+1(·) = 0 and Gt(0, ft) = 0, t = 1, . . . , T . By Proposition 2 and (2),
the optimal decisions of (1) and (7) are identical. Moreover, the expected total regret and the
expected total revenue sum up to the expected clairvoyant optimal revenue. It is important to note
that the regret minimization formulation gives the same optimal stochastic control as the revenue
maximization formulation. However, the performance measure is different under this regret-based
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where the expected regret E [R(πo)] defined in (3) is in fact the optimal expected regret G1(x1, f1)
solved using the dynamic program defined in (7). It is clear that 1≤R(π)≤∞.





Figure 1 Regret-Based Reformulation and Performance Measure
We shall draw the connection between the regret ratio defined in (8) under this equivalent regret
minimization reformulation and the conventional revenue ratio defined by the ratio of the total
revenue of π to that of the optimal policy πo under the original revenue maximization formulation.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for each instance of the problem, a lower regret ratio of π always leads
to a higher revenue ratio of π, and vice versa. However, these two performance measures are
incomparable. In many retail industries with low price discrimination, the regret ratio can better
capture how good a feasible policy π is (see Example 1 below). The regret ratio “zooms in” on the
operational mistakes that a firm makes, thereby improving the (already thin) profit margin.
Example 1. Let us consider a practical example in which the price discrimination is rather low,
i.e., r1 and r2 are quite close, say r1 = 100 and r2 = 95. This example is abundant in practical
settings, e.g., coupon discounts, omnichannel retailing (in-store vs. online), etc. Let us consider a
simple (and clearly sub-optimal) feasible policy that accepts all customers as long as the inventory
does not run out, which we call it “all-accept” policy. It is clear that the revenue difference between
an optimal policy and the all-accept policy is always bounded by 5% (regardless of the input
stochastic processes), if the firm chooses to use the traditional revenue-based performance measure.
However, this all-accept policy is undoubtedly a very poor heuristic policy, since it ignores all the
inventory and demand information.
In contrast, in such cases, the regret ratios of sub-optimal policies similar to all-accept policies
are usually very high, which better captures the “real” performance of such policies. For instance,
one can fix M = 3 and construct a sample path with class-2,2,2,1,1,1 arrival sequence, the all-
accept policy would accept 2,2,2 while the optimal policy would accept 1,1,1. In this case, the
revenue error is only 5% while the regret error is infinity (since none of the decisions from the
all-accept policy are correct)! 
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The above example shows that the regret measure quantifies the regret or the cost of a poor
decision in a much lucid way, which allows the firm to better trade-off between acceptance and
rejection. We remark that this notion of regret ratio defined in (8) has also been proposed and used
in other fields such as the theory of online and statistical learning (see, e.g., Guha and Munagala
[25] that gives a conceptually similar regret ratio).
4. Approximation Algorithm: Regret-Parity Policy
In this section, we propose and analyze an efficient and effective admission-control policy called the
regret-parity policy, denoted by π̃, which aims to exactly balance between the regret of acceptance
and the regret of rejection. The proposed policy π̃ is a randomized policy, which makes a randomized
admission decision in each period based on computed probabilities.
4.1. Policy Description
To fully describe and analyze π̃ which invovles randomzied decision rules, we introduce the expanded
information set f+t that not only includes the original information set ft but also all the randomized
decisions of π̃ up to period t− 1. Thus, given π̃ and f+t , the inventory level xt at the beginning of
period t is known but the decision in period t remains unknown. In addition, we define f++T as f
+
T
plus the decision made in period T , which constitutes a full sample path.
Now we describe π̃ as follows. In each period t= 1, . . . , T , if a class-1 customer arrives, we accept
her as long as the inventory xt > 0. On the other hand, if a class-2 customer arrives and xt > 0, π̃
accepts her with probability θt and reject her with probability 1− θt. That is, we set
απ̃t =
{
1, with probability θt,
0, with probability 1− θt,
where probability θt is computed by solving
θt ·E
[
RAπ̃t (1) | f+t
]
= (1− θt) ·E
[
RRπ̃t (0) | f+t
]
, (9)
where RAπ̃t (·) and RRπ̃t (·) are defined in (5) and (6), respectively. It is clear that the proposed
regret-parity policy π̃ strikes an exact balance between the two types of regrets via (9).
We also discuss here how to efficiently evaluate the expectation E
[





RRπ̃t (0) | f+t
]
) in practical implementations. First observe via (5) that because A1[t,T ] takes integer
values from 0 to T − t + 1, evaluating E
[
RAπ̃t (1) | f+t
]
has the same complexity of computing
P(A1[t,T ] = i) for i = 0, . . . , T − t+ 1. When the demands are i.i.d., the computation is easy since
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A1[t,T ] follows a binomial distribution. When the demands are generally correlated, e.g., the Markov
modulated demand processes tested in §6.1, computing the exact values of P(A1[t,T ] = i) for i =
0, . . . , T−t+1 is not straightforward. For practical purposes, we use Monte Carlo simulation method
to obtain a very close estimation. In our numerical experiments, the coefficient of variation of using
5000 sample paths to estimate the expectation is generally less than 1%. We note that [36, 56]
face the same computational challenges when evaluating similar expectations in other (inventory)
settings. The main computational advantage of π̃ lies in that π̃ can be efficiently implemented in an
online manner, i.e., the decision at any time is computed based only on the current observed state
of the system and does not depend on future decisions. This is a desired property if one wishes to
avoid the prohibitive (recursive) computational burden of solving large dynamic programs.
4.2. Performance Analysis
To establish a worst-case performance guarantee of 2, we wish to show that, on expectation, the
total regret of the optimal policy πo “pays” for at least half of that of the regret-parity policy π̃.
In the subsequent analysis, we use superscript πo to refer to the optimal policy that solves the
dynamic programming (1), and superscript π̃ to refer to our regret-parity policy.
We first define a stopping time τ which records the first period time when the inventory of π̃
runs out. More specifically, we define
τ = inf
{
t∈ {1, . . . , T + 1} :X π̃t = 0
}
. (10)
Note that τ is well-defined since it is measurable w.r.t. the expanded information set f+t .
We then partition the set of periods {1, . . . , T} into three disjoint random subsets
Ta =
{
t∈ {1, . . . , T} : t < τ and Y π
o










Tc = {t∈ {1, . . . , T} : τ ≤ t≤ T} . (13)
Note that the above subsets are disjoint and exhaustive, and the indicators 1(t ∈ Ta), 1(t ∈ Tb)
and 1(t∈Tc) become known with the expanded information set f+t .
Then, we prove two important lemmas below. We want to show that the total regret of acceptance
incurred by πo is higher than that incurred by π̃ in the set Ta in Lemma 1, and the total regret of
rejection incurred by πo is higher than that incurred by π̃ in the set Tb in Lemma 2.
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Lemma 1. The total regret of acceptance by πo is no smaller than that by π̃ in the set Ta, i.e.,













Proof. We fix an arbitrary sample path f++T . Suppose there are l customer arrivals, and let
1≤ t1 ≤ . . .≤ tl ≤ T denote all these l customer arriving epochs. We then denote ts to be the last
customer arriving epoch that belongs to the set Ta.
For each k= 1, . . . s− 1, since there is no customer arrival over (tk, tk+1), it is clear that a1(tk,T ] =



































































where the second equality follows from expanding the telescoping sum and (14); the third equality
holds because there is no customer arrival before t1, and thus a
1
[t1,T ]















)+− (a1[1,T ]−M)+] . (16)
Because ts ∈Ta implies that yπ
o
ts
≤ xπ̃ts − 1≤ y
π̃
ts




























where the second inequality follows from comparing (15) and (16) with yπ
o
ts
≤ yπ̃ts . Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. The total regret of rejection by πo is no smaller than that by π̃ in the set Tb, i.e.,
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Proof. We fix an arbitrary sample path f++T . Suppose there are l customer arrivals, and let
1≤ t1 ≤ . . .≤ tl ≤ T denote all these l customer arriving epochs. We then denote ts to be the last
customer arriving epoch that belongs to the set Tb.
For each k= 1, . . . s− 1, since there is no customer arrival over (tk, tk+1), it is clear that a1,2(tk,T ] =







































































M − a1,2[1,T ]
)+]
,
where the second equality follows from expanding the telescoping sum and (17); the third equality
holds because there is no customer arrival before t1, and thus a
1,2
[t1,T ]


















M − a1,2[1,T ]
)+]
. (19)
Because ts ∈Tb implies that yπ
o
ts
≥ xπ̃ts ≥ y
π̃
ts





























where the second inequality follows from comparing (18) and (19) with yπ
o
ts
≥ yπ̃ts . Q.E.D.
Lemmas 1 and 2 establish a connection between πo and π̃. To complete the worst-case analysis,











t ) | F+t
]
. (20)
Note that Z π̃t is a random variable that is realized with the information set f
+
t at the beginning of
period t. Observe that by the construction of π̃, the random variable Z π̃t is well-defined since the
expected regret of acceptance and the expected regret of rejection are always balanced.
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Lemma 3 below shows that the expected total regret of π̃ can be expressed using the Z π̃t variables
defined in (20).
Lemma 3. The expected total regret incurred by π̃ is








Proof. By Proposition 2 and standard arguments of conditional expectations, we have




























































where the fourth equality follows directly from the definition in (20). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 below shows that the expected total regret of πo can be upper bounded using the Z π̃t
variables defined in (20).









Proof. Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 and the fact the Z π̃t = 0 when t∈ Tc, we have



































































where the fourth equality holds since 1(t ∈Ta), 1(t ∈Tb) and 1(t ∈Tc) are measurable with the
expanded information set F+t . Q.E.D.
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Combining Lemmas 3 and 4, we have established that the π̃ policy has a constant worst-case
performance guarantee of 2, which is stated formally below.
Theorem 1. For each instance of the two-class revenue management problem under non-
stationary customer demands, the expected total regret incurred by the regret-parity policy π̃ is at
most two times the expected total regret incurred by the optimal policy πo, i.e.,
E [R(π̃)]≤ 2 ·E [R(πo)] .
Theorem 1 asserts that π̃ achieves a 2-approximation of the optimal policy in terms of stochastic
relative regret, which establishes an interesting link between the relative regret and approximation
algorithms in the revenue management setting.
5. Multi-Class Extension with Fairness
We consider an extension of our model to the multi-class setting which incorporates a fairness
constraint. The model is almost identical to that defined in §2 but with I classes of customers.
Without loss of generality, we let r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . ≥ rI ≥ 0, and we say class-i has a higher priority
than class-j whenever i < j. Similar to the 2-class model, the total arrival rate and the probability
of being class-i customer are both evolving over time. In this model, class-1 customers are always
accepted if there are inventory units available, but we need to make a decision whether to accept
a customer if she is not a class-1 customer. We define our notion of fairness.
Definition 1. We say a feasible policy π is said to be fair if the following condition holds. If for
each period t= 1, . . . , T with an arriving customer (of class 1≤ j ≤ T ), then for all 1≤ i < j < k≤ I,
i.e., class-i (class-k) has a higher (lower) revenue or priority than class-j, the policy π is allowed
to accept this class-j customer in period t only if when there is no class-i customer rejected by π
before period t, and π is allowed to reject this class-j customer in period t only if when there is no
class-k customer accepted by π before period t.
This notion of fairness asserts that when π accepts a customer, π needs to accept all the customers
with higher priorities; when π rejects a customer, π needs to reject all the customers with lower
priorities. In many practical settings, not enforcing strict fairness may adversely affect customer
loyalty to the firm. In the example of vacation timeshare management mentioned in §1, Hilton
Grand Vacations Club offers timeshares at four different levels, namely, platinum, gold, silver,
bronze [11]. During a particular selling season, the management will not sell a home resort (e.g., a
room in Elara on the Las Vegas strip) to a gold customer if it has previously rejected a platinum
customer. Likewise, the management will not reject a gold customer if it has previously accepted
a silver customer. The management has the incentives to enforce such fairness, because of the
extensive interactions between timeshare users in online forums [52].
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5.1. Extended Definitions of Regret
We extend the definitions of RAPt (α
P




t ) defined in §4. For any feasible policy π, there
can be two scenarios when a random customer arrives in period t.
(a) Active decision making: π needs to decide whether to accept or reject this customer;
(b) Passive decision making: π does not need to make an active decision, if this arriving customer
is “automatically” accepted or rejected due to either fairness or stock-out.
In the former scenario (a), the active decision made by π incurs a regret of acceptance or rejection,
whereas in the latter scenario (b), there is no regret incurred in period t since π does not make
any decisions. For any feasible policy π, to define our regrets RAπt (α
π




t ), we use
W (π∗;fT , α
π
0 , . . . , α
π
t )
to denote the modified clairvoyant optimal revenue given a fixed sample path fT and fixed decisions
απ0 , . . . , α
π
t in the first t periods. Intuitively, the modified clairvoyant optimal policy π
∗ takes the
first t-period (potentially sub-optimal) decisions as given, and generates the highest revenue over
the remaining periods [t, T ] along the sample path fT . With this modified definition, we define the
two regrets below. Fix a sample path fT and examine any period t= 1, . . . , T .
(a) If π accepts the incoming customer in period t, then the regret of acceptance is defined by
RAπt (α
π
t = 1) | fT = W (π∗;fT , απ0 , . . . , απt−1)−W (π∗;fT , απ0 , . . . , απt−1,1). (21)
The underlying idea is simple. The regret of acceptance in period t is exactly the difference between
two revenues, one resulted from taking the “optimal” actions in hindsight from period t onwards,
and the other one resulted from taking an acceptance decision in period t and then taking the
“optimal” a tions in hindsight from period t+ 1 onwards.
(b) If π rejects the incoming customer in period t, then the regret of acceptance is defined by
RRπt (α
π
t = 0) | fT = W (π∗;fT , απ0 , . . . , απt−1)−W (π∗;fT , απ0 , . . . , απt−1,0). (22)
The idea is similar by merely taking a dual view of (a).
5.2. Extended Regret-Parity Policy
With these extended definitions (21–22), we re-define the regret-parity policy π̃ below. Since π̃ is
randomized, we use the expanded information set f+t that not only includes the original information
set ft but also all the randomized decisions of π̃ up to period t− 1.
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Suppose a customer arrives in period t and π̃ needs to make an active decision. Then π̃ will
accept her with probability θt and reject with probability 1− θt, i.e., απ̃t = 1 with probability θt
and απ̃t = 0 with probability 1− θt, where θt is computed by solving
θt ·E[RAπ̃t (1) | f+t ] = (1− θt) ·E[RRπ̃t (0) | f+t ].
5.3. Performance Analysis
At any customer arrival time t (post-decision), we keep track of three critical numbers associated
with any feasible policy π, namely, γπt being the lowest revenue class that π has accepted, β
π
t being
the highest revenue class that π has rejected (not due to stock-out), and the ending inventory level
Y πt . As a convention, we initialize γ
π
0 = 0 and β
π
0 = I + 1.
Lemma 5. At any customer arrival time t where Y π̃t > 0, we have




t , then γ
π̃













t ≤ γπ̃t ≤ βπ̃t .








t ≤ βπ̃t = βπ
o
t .
At a high-level, with the fairness constraint, we can clearly keep track of the accept/reject status
of each class of two different policies by merely comparing their aggregate ending inventory levels.
In the absence of fairness, these relationships in Lemma 5 will not hold, thereby making the cost
comparison between two different policies very challenging. With aid of Lemma 5, we can prove
the following result, similar to Lemmas 1 and 2 in the two-class case.

























With identical arguments, Lemmas 3 and 4 hold for the multi-class setting with fairness as well.
Combining these results, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For each instance of the multi-class admission-control policy based revenue man-
agement problem under fairness, the expected total regret incurred by the regret-parity policy π̃ is
at most two times the expected total regret incurred by the optimal policy πo, i.e.,
E [R(π̃)]≤ 2 ·E [R(πo)] .
6. Numerical Experiments
To test the empirical performances of our proposed policy π̃, we conduct an extensive numerical
study and report our numerical results.
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6.1. Design of Experiments
We set the discrete time horizon T = 50 periods. We normalize the revenue rate of class-1 customers
r1 = 100 and vary the revenue rate of class-2 customers r2 ∈ {20,30,40, . . . ,80}. We consider two
types of demand processes described as follows.
(a) I.I.D. demands: In the i.i.d. demand setting, in each period t= 1, . . . , T , we test a range of
arrival probabilities p1, p2 ∈ {0.2,0.25,0.3,0.35,0.4}. The probability of having no arrivals is then
1− p1− p2. In addition, we set the initial inventory M = T (p1 +κ · p2), where the initial inventory
M is controlled by κ∈ {−0.2,0,0.2}.
(b) Correlated demands: We also consider a correlated demand setting where the instanta-
neous rates are time-varying and correlated, which are modulated by an exogenous Markov chain.
In this Markov modulated demand setting, we keep the choices of parameters T , r1, r2, p1 p2, and
M the same as in the i.i.d. demand setting. In addition, we introduce three states of economy,
namely, good (denoted by state 1), fair (denoted by state 2), poor (denoted by state 3), and the
arrival rate is affected by the state of economy. We set the initial state to be state 2. The state
transition is modulated by an exogenous Markov chain. More specifically, the arrival probability
depends on p1, p2 and the state of economy. Let p
i(j) denote the arrival probability for class-i
customer when the state of economy is j, where i= 1,2 and j = 1,2,3. We set
p1(1) = 1.5p1, p2(1) = 0.5p2,
p1(2) = p1, p2(2) = p2,
p1(3) = 0.5p1, p2(3) = 1.5p2.
.
The above construction captures the fact that customers will buy higher-class (lower-class) products
with a higher probability when the state of economy is better (poorer). We consider two transition












The above two transition probability matrices P1 and P2 represent positively-correlated and
negatively-correlated demands, respectively.
6.2. Performance Measure and Benchmark Policies
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Besides the above standard performance measures, we also compare our policy with the policies
proposed in Ball and Queyranne [1]. In their paper, the authors presented two robust optimization
algorithms that can be applied in our setting. Both policies having the form of setting a threshold
level for the maximum amount of class-2 customer to be admitted.
Benchmark Algorithm 1: The first algorithm is a static policy that have a fixed threshold











on which number gives the best competitive ratio in their robust optimization problem.
Benchmark Algorithm 2: The second algorithm is a dynamic policy that keeps updating the
threshold level throughout the planning horizon. In each period t, let h′ denote the total number





. Then the threshold level in each






For every instance of the problem, we denote the better expected revenue of the two robust
benchmark algorithms by W (πrobust). Then the relative gain in expected revenue by using our








We note that their robust algorithms are established in the online adversarial setting (that does
not require any future demand information as an input). Our algorithm, on the other hand, does
require evolving conditional future demand information, as time progresses. Hence the numerical
comparison between our policy and theirs is not entirely fair. Nevertheless, in the absence of better
alternatives, we adapt their algorithms to our setting and compare the numerical performances.
As seen from Tables 1–3, our proposed regret-parity policy π̃ performs consistently well in term of
expected revenue and regret, compared to the optimal policy. Compared to the robust benchmark
algorithms proposed in Ball and Queyranne [1], we gain around 16% more expected revenue, which
is quite significant. Also, it is interesting to observe that this ratio ηgain is higher when the starting
inventory is smaller ( i.e., κ is smaller), and when r2 is smaller. This is because when there is less
starting inventory, the optimal policy shall reject almost all the class-2 customers, but the robust
benchmark algorithm always accepts some class-2 customer as long as the threshold level has not
been reached. And when r2 is small, this loss becomes more significant.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a class of revenue management problems with non-homogeneous
Poisson customer arrival processes. We have proposed a new regret minimization framework and
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Table 1 Performance of π̃ under i.i.d. demands
κ -0.2 0 0.2
r2 min mean max min mean max min mean max
εregret
20
39.0% 42.2% 45.6% 31.8% 35.1% 40.2% 24.4% 28.8% 34.9%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.11% 0.26% 0.11% 0.25% 0.45% 0.17% 0.36% 0.62%
ηgain 17.5% 30.7% 54.5% 13.5% 22.0% 34.2% 8.5% 11.6% 14.1%
εregret
30
28.5% 34.9% 38.9% 23.8% 29.2% 34.3% 19.1% 24.2% 29.5%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.12% 0.29% 0.12% 0.27% 0.50% 0.18% 0.37% 0.66%
ηgain 17.4% 30.1% 48.4% 13.4% 21.9% 32.2% 8.6% 12.1% 14.6%
εregret
40
23.9% 30.5% 34.7% 20.0% 25.7% 30.4% 17.0% 21.5% 26.0%
εrevenue 0.04% 0.13% 0.30% 0.12% 0.28% 0.51% 0.18% 0.37% 0.66%
ηgain 15.7% 27.1% 44.1% 12.4% 20.4% 31.0% 8.0% 11.6% 14.4%
εregret
50
19.2% 27.4% 30.5% 16.2% 23.4% 26.5% 13.9% 19.9% 22.6%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.13% 0.31% 0.12% 0.27% 0.50% 0.18% 0.36% 0.63%
ηgain 13.5% 23.5% 38.7% 10.7% 17.9% 26.9% 7.0% 10.4% 13.1%
εregret
60
20.2% 25.9% 28.8% 18.0% 22.5% 25.3% 16.4% 19.7% 21.8%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.12% 0.29% 0.11% 0.26% 0.47% 0.16% 0.34% 0.58%
ηgain 11.0% 18.9% 28.6% 8.6% 14.4% 20.9% 5.6% 8.7% 11.3%
εregret
70
21.1% 25.5% 27.4% 19.3% 22.5% 23.9% 17.9% 20.4% 21.7%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.11% 0.27% 0.09% 0.24% 0.43% 0.14% 0.31% 0.53%
ηgain 8.3% 14.2% 21.5% 6.4% 11.0% 16.4% 4.1% 6.6% 8.6%
εregret
80
23.8% 25.6% 27.6% 21.7% 23.4% 25.0% 20.8% 22.0% 23.6%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.10% 0.23% 0.09% 0.21% 0.36% 0.14% 0.27% 0.45%
ηgain 5.4% 9.5% 14.9% 4.1% 7.2% 10.6% 2.5% 4.4% 6.0%
Table 2 Performance of π̃ under (positively-correlated) Markov modulated demands
κ -0.2 0 0.2
r2 min mean max min mean max min mean max
εregret
20
24.3% 49.2% 83.4% 24.7% 36.3% 83.2% 23.5% 31.5% 46.5%
εrevenue 0.04% 0.13% 0.27% 0.12% 0.27% 0.46% 0.19% 0.38% 0.63%
ηgain 17.0% 30.3% 53.8% 13.0% 21.6% 33.6% 8.4% 11.6% 14.2%
εregret
30
20.6% 36.9% 69.7% 20.1% 30.4% 50.4% 18.4% 24.8% 33.5%
εrevenue 0.04% 0.14% 0.31% 0.13% 0.28% 0.50% 0.20% 0.38% 0.67%
ηgain 16.8% 29.7% 48.1% 12.9% 21.5% 31.8% 8.4% 12.0% 14.6%
εregret
40
23.4% 30.0% 38.9% 19.2% 25.2% 33.5% 16.0% 20.7% 24.9%
εrevenue 0.05% 0.14% 0.31% 0.13% 0.28% 0.51% 0.19% 0.37% 0.65%
ηgain 15.2% 26.8% 43.8% 11.9% 20.0% 30.6% 7.8% 11.5% 14.4%
εregret
50
17.3% 26.3% 34.8% 17.4% 23.0% 27.3% 13.5% 19.5% 22.4%
εrevenue 0.04% 0.14% 0.31% 0.10% 0.25% 0.46% 0.18% 0.35% 0.62%
ηgain 13.1% 23.2% 38.3% 10.3% 17.5% 26.5% 6.8% 10.3% 13.1%
εregret
60
20.3% 24.3% 28.2% 17.2% 21.3% 25.4% 16.5% 19.2% 21.5%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.13% 0.30% 0.10% 0.25% 0.46% 0.15% 0.33% 0.56%
ηgain 10.6% 18.7% 28.4% 8.3% 14.1% 20.6% 5.4% 8.6% 11.2%
εregret
70
20.6% 24.1% 27.6% 19.5% 21.3% 22.9% 16.8% 19.3% 21.2%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.12% 0.26% 0.09% 0.23% 0.41% 0.13% 0.30% 0.51%
ηgain 8.0% 14.0% 21.4% 6.2% 10.8% 16.2% 3.9% 6.6% 8.5%
εregret
80
21.9% 24.1% 29.4% 19.7% 22.0% 24.9% 19.0% 20.9% 22.3%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.10% 0.23% 0.09% 0.20% 0.35% 0.13% 0.26% 0.44%
ηgain 5.2% 9.4% 14.8% 3.9% 7.1% 10.5% 2.4% 4.3% 5.9%
proceeded using the lens of approximation algorithms to devise a conceptually simple and provably-
good regret-parity policy. We have made some important progress towards better understanding the
intricate link between stochastic regret minimization and approximation algorithms in the realm
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Table 3 Performance of π̃ under (negatively-correlated) Markov modulated demands
κ -0.2 0 0.2
r2 min mean max min mean max min mean max
εregret
20
28.5% 46.3% 71.0% 24.3% 39.1% 54.0% 25.2% 31.5% 39.6%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.12% 0.27% 0.13% 0.27% 0.47% 0.20% 0.39% 0.64%
ηgain 17.7% 30.9% 54.7% 13.7% 22.1% 34.4% 8.5% 11.6% 14.1%
εregret
30
27.1% 42.8% 66.8% 21.9% 32.9% 42.6% 17.9% 27.7% 34.7%
εrevenue 0.04% 0.13% 0.30% 0.14% 0.29% 0.49% 0.21% 0.40% 0.65%
ηgain 17.5% 30.2% 48.6% 13.5% 22.1% 32.4% 8.6% 12.1% 14.6%
εregret
40
23.3% 34.8% 61.4% 16.7% 27.6% 38.8% 16.7% 22.8% 28.5%
εrevenue 0.04% 0.13% 0.31% 0.14% 0.29% 0.52% 0.20% 0.38% 0.65%
ηgain 15.9% 27.2% 44.1% 12.6% 20.5% 31.1% 8.1% 11.6% 14.4%
εregret
50
19.1% 28.9% 34.2% 16.9% 24.8% 30.4% 15.8% 20.7% 27.6%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.13% 0.30% 0.13% 0.27% 0.48% 0.20% 0.36% 0.62%
ηgain 13.6% 23.6% 38.8% 10.8% 18.0% 27.1% 7.1% 10.4% 13.2%
εregret
60
19.7% 26.3% 32.3% 20.1% 23.5% 27.7% 16.9% 20.0% 22.1%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.12% 0.29% 0.12% 0.26% 0.47% 0.17% 0.33% 0.58%
ηgain 11.1% 19.0% 28.7% 8.8% 14.5% 21.0% 5.7% 8.7% 11.3%
εregret
70
22.3% 26.2% 29.5% 17.4% 22.1% 24.5% 18.6% 20.4% 22.6%
εrevenue 0.03% 0.11% 0.26% 0.09% 0.23% 0.42% 0.14% 0.30% 0.52%
ηgain 8.4% 14.3% 21.5% 6.5% 11.1% 16.5% 4.2% 6.7% 8.6%
εregret
80
23.4% 25.3% 32.8% 21.7% 23.0% 25.0% 20.1% 21.5% 25.3%
εrevenue 0.02% 0.09% 0.21% 0.09% 0.20% 0.36% 0.13% 0.26% 0.44%
ηgain 5.5% 9.6% 15.0% 4.2% 7.3% 10.7% 2.6% 4.4% 6.0%
of revenue management and dynamic resource allocation. We believe combining the ideas from
approximation algorithms with this new regret minimization framework can yield many fruitful
results and discussions in many other core resource allocation or revenue management problems.
To close this paper, we would like to point out two immediate and plausible future research
directions as follows. (a) One may wish to waive the fairness requirement in the multi-class setting.
(b) One can also consider a pricing version of the same problem, in which the firm can dynamically
update their prices. However, developing worst-case performance guarantees for the aforementioned
directions remains challenging and would require new ideas and methods to be developed.
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Appendix: Omitted Technical Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We can write














. Moreover, if the number of class-2 customers accepted by π is greater than that
accepted by π∗, then the number of class-1 customers accepted by π will decrease by (C2π −
C2π∗). Otherwise, C
1
π will be equal to C
1
π∗ . Thus, combining the two cases above, we have C
1
π =
min{C1π∗ ,C1π∗ − (C2π −C2π∗)} . Hence, by (2) and some simple algebra, we have





π∗ − r1C1π − r2C2π
= r1(C
1
π∗ −C1π) + r2(C2π∗ −C2π)
= r1
(














π −C2π∗)+ + r2(C2π∗ −C2π).
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We fix an arbitrary sample path fT . Suppose there are l customers
arrived at the system, and let 1≤ t1 ≤ . . .≤ tl ≤ T denote all these l customer arriving epochs. We
then denote ts to be the last customer arriving epoch in which the firm is not out of stock. Using












































)+− (a1[1,T ]−M)+]+ r2 [(yπts − a1,2(ts,T ])+− (M − l)+] ,











, a1[tk+1,T ] = a
1
(tk,T ]
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There are two cases as follows.
Case 1. There is some inventory left in the end of the horizon, i.e., yπT > 0. This implies that
ts = tl and y
π
ts
= yπT > 0. Moreover, the total number of class-1 customers is less than the initial










∣∣∣∣ fT = r2 (yπT − (M − l)+) .
Moreover, because C2π ≤C2π∗ , (4) becomes R(π) = r2(C2π∗ −C2π). Therefore, it suffices to show that
yπT − (M − l)+ =C2π∗ −C2π. (27)




[1,T ] in this case, and hence y
π
T =M −C1π −C2π =M −C1π∗ −C2π. Then
(27) becomes M − (M − l)+ =C1π∗ +C2π∗ , which is valid since C1π∗ +C2π∗ = min(M,l).
Case 2. All the inventory units are used up at the end of the horizon. This implies that yπts = 0,










∣∣∣∣ fT = (r1− r2) (a1(ts,T ]− (a1[1,T ]−M)+) .
Moreover, b cause C2π ≥C2π∗ , (4) becomes R(π) = (r1−r2)(C2π−C2π∗). Therefore, it suffices to argue
a1(ts,T ]− (a
1
[1,T ]−M)+ =C2π −C2π∗ . (28)






π = M in this case, and hence C
2
π = M − a1[1,ts]. Then (28)
becomes a1(ts,T ]− (a
1
[1,T ]−M)+ =M − a1[1,ts]−C
2
π∗ , which is valid due to the fact that if a
1
[1,T ] ≥M ,
then C2π∗ = 0, and otherwise, C
2
π∗ =M − a1[1,T ].
Combining the above cases, the two regret accounting schemes are indeed equivalent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. We fix a sample path f++T . It is clear that γ
π̃





nition 1 of our fairness constraint. In Case (a), we can always find a customer accepted by πo but
rejected by π̃. Denote the class of this particular customer by κ and we can see that γπ̃t ≤ βπ̃t ≤
κ≤ γπot ≤ βπ
o




t , if all the decisions
for two policies are the same, the claim holds trivially. Otherwise the only possible case under the
fairness constraint is that both policies accept and reject the same class customer in a different







Proof of Lemma 6. Identical to (11–13) in the two-class case, we partition the set of periods
{1, . . . , T} into three disjoint subsets Ta, Tb and Tc. Since π̃ generates no regret in Tc, we focus
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on Ta and Tb only. Now we fix a sample path f
++
T , and examine any period t= 1, . . . , T . If t∈Ta,
as long as πo holds positive inventory, by Lemma 5, πo must accept all the customers that are
accepted by π̃. Hence, by the same argument in Lemma 1, the cumulative regret of acceptance
incurred by πo must be higher than or equal to π̃. Similarly, if t∈Tb, we can see by Lemma 5 that
πo must reject all the customers that are rejected by π̃. Hence, by the same argument in Lemma
2, the cumulative regret of rejection incurred by πo must be higher than or equal to π̃. Q.E.D.
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